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E

ach State Party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban

some instances meant that operators and national programs

Convention (APMBC) that knows or suspects it has

have eschewed risk-management methods in favor of ultra-

areas under its jurisdiction or control that contain

cautious (and ultra-expensive) approaches. Any ongoing mine

anti-personnel (AP) mines has a clear deadline to locate and

clearance operation that does not locate a single mine (or other

destroy those mines. According to Article 5(1), upon becom-

explosive threat) within ten days should ask itself whether it is

ing party to the APMBC, a State must complete clearance

working in the right place.

within ten years, unless the deadline is pushed back in an

But while many States Parties seem to regard time as an

agreement from the other States Parties at an annual meeting

infinite resource, funds—whether national or international—

or five-yearly review conference.1

are most assuredly not. Even without the dictates of financial

The nature of the obligation is to make every effort to find

austerity and blossoming budget deficits, funding for mine

all mined areas with AP mines in areas located on sovereign

clearance operations would already be in decline. The increas-

territory or on territory a State effectively controls abroad.

ingly steep decline that we are currently witnessing will only

Once a suspected mined area is confirmed as contaminated,

accelerate in coming years, though major support for specif-

the State Party must then destroy all the AP mines contained

ic operations will likely still be available in case of overriding

therein. In practice, however, all does not really mean all. This

humanitarian need (e.g., should peace break out in Syria).

is the understandable result of technological constraints allied
to the explicit introduction of risk-management methodology
into demining operations. Detection technology limits the
depth at which AP mines, especially those with minimum-

What does this mean for the implementation of the
APMBC?

First,

the generosity of extension periods
with which States Parties have too

metal content, will be identified. Mines that lie more than a

frequently rewarded sluggishness and inefficiency must come

dozen or so centimeters below the surface will likely remain

to an end. Granting long extensions to laggard programs

undetected; however, some may rise in the months or years

scarcely encourages positive change. Moreover, if a State Party

following clearance operations, presenting an ongoing threat

is willfully failing to make every effort to confirm mined

to life and limb. Similarly, a decision must be taken as to

areas and then clear them “as soon as possible” (as Article 5

which areas are subjected to full clearance and at which point

demands), they should not be granted an extension.1 The legal

this will start and end. The result of this decision may be that

reality should reflect the political and operational realities:

actual contamination is unwittingly overlooked.

that a State Party is in violation both of the APMBC and of

In reality, the problem with demining is less that adjacent

international law. The notion of State responsibility means

areas contaminated with mines are missed. Far more often,

that a State should indeed be held responsible for its actions

operations focus and persist in areas that palpably are

and its inaction. The current approach of the States Parties

not contaminated with explosive devices, which impede

is to reward failure and willful inaction, hardly one that is

efficiency. Poor survey techniques and fear of legal liability in

conducive to encourage accountability and responsibility.

“Any ongoing mine clearance operation that does not locate
a single mine (or other explosive threat) within ten days
should ask itself whether it is working in the right place.”
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Second,

the Implementation Support

not just suspected mined areas. This is even the case in States

Unit (ISU) needs to up its game

with demining programs that have been ongoing for two de-

materially. The new director, recently appointed, should ensure

cades or longer. Investing in high-quality non-technical sur-

that extension requests are not just checked for formalist and

vey is a major operational requirement, not an optional extra.

procedural issues, but also that the review assesses whether

From 28 November to 2 December 2016, States Parties and

the data is robust and coherent, and that the associated plans

States not yet party to the APMBC will convene in Santiago,

are ambitious and evidence-based. One 2016 extension request

Chile, for the fifteenth meeting of the States Parties. Will it be

that was on the cusp of being submitted, and which the ISU

business as usual? Another triumph of diplomatic form over

reviewed, contained an unacceptable number of logical

operational substance? Or will States Parties finally grasp the

blunders and glaring mathematical errors. To ensure this does

mettle and resolve to make the Maputo Review Conference

not reoccur, States must support the ISU with the necessary

pledge of well-nigh completing global clearance by 2025 an

financial, human, and technical resources and requisite

operational reality?
See endnotes page 67

mandate to enable the ISU to do its work professionally.

Third,

oversight of demining programs in
affected States Parties needs to be

The author is editor of the Mine Action Review, produced

enhanced. This is a task for donor States and operational ex-

by Norwegian People’s Aid, and honorary professor at the

perts. It is time the cooperative duty to facilitate and clarify

University of Pretoria’s Faculty of Law. This article is written in

compliance under APMBC Article 8(1) is applied directly to

an individual capacity.

operations. With the consent of the territorial State, a mission
of experts is an informal mechanism and no threat to sovereignty; a State Party that has nothing to hide should seek to
hide nothing. Every year two or three States, especially those
imminently seeking an extension, could be assessed without
significant financial outlay on anyone’s part and then supported where necessary.

Fourth,

it is a regrettable reality that
while lip service is paid to land

release, in many programs the risk-management processes
inherent in the concept are, in the words of Hamlet, “more
honor’d in the breach than in the observance.” Although landmine impact survey methodology has received the last rites,
the wilder estimates of massive, widespread contamination
and devastating impact that it falsely generated still call to us
from beyond the grave. Today, far too few States can proffer a
rational estimate of contamination based on confirmed and
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